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Dual Citizenship in Athens and Jerusalem: Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Promise of
Lutheran Higher Education
Mark C. Mattes
Beyond the desert of criticism we seek to be called again. -Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil.

In contrast with other Christian approaches to the
question of the relationship between faith and learning,
which tend either to isolate faith from learning or to over
accentuate a continuum between them, the Lutheran
approach to Christian higher education seeks to develop a
conversation between faith and learning that preserves
the integrity of each and can address current secularistic
biases that would inhibit the attempt to establish a
dialogue between faith and learning. In an attempt to
flesh out a model of dialogue that can help us better
understand how to model a faith-based approach to
higher education, one can look to the work of the
contemporary French philosopher and theorist of
language and interpretation, Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's
work can provide a model for discerning various
phenomenological elements of dialogue (such as
listening, risk, open-endedness, and mutuality), offer a
framework from within a "neutral" or non-faith
perspective for making the dialogue between faith and
learning a plausible and worthwhile endeavor, and show
how education as a process is a profoundly hermeneutical
task. His understanding of myth as an indispensable
category for interpreting human behavior, truth primarily
as manifestation and not correspondence, and
secularism's ability to dehumanize people calls for a
retrieval of a faith-based approach to education congenial
to the Lutheran tradition. Himself a layman of the French
Reformed Church, Ricoeur offers work that should help
us clarify the educational dynamics that can be operative
at Lutheran-related schools.

that which is outside of faith are permitted and
encouraged as essential components in the development
of the life of the mind. In other words, unlike much
secular-based education, Lutheran higher education
proposes that questions of faith are worthy of one's
reflection; and, in contrast to many sectarian Christian
institutions, at Lutheran colleges and universities it is
permissible--indeed sometimes necessary-to criticize
our presuppositions of faith in the hope of refining our
faith-inspired perspectives. Admittedly, this task is risky
for faith. We might lose our faith in the process of self
criticism. Nevertheless, as it will be seen, if we follow
Luther's and/or Ricoeur's thinking, a faith that insists on
security of whatever sort proves not to be genuine faith at
all. 1
In some perspectives in higher education, faith issues and
questions are thought to be solely a private matter. In this
view, scholars want to preserve human autonomy from
the threat of authoritarianism and defend scientific
research from the challenge of "obscuritanism." Hence,
in their view, faith is an irrational disposition or blind
acceptance of the religious legitimization of social
institutions. By contrast, for church-related higher
education, faith issues are thought to engage the life of
the mind and even challenge our assumptions about
social legitimization. Faith issues are permitted to be
public, even though these issues will not receive univocal
answers from church-related faculties, whose views often
reflect the pluralism of the wider academy. Hence,
church-related colleges should seek to foster both
academic excellence and spiritual growth, and not just
provide opportunities for spiritual growth. How might
this be possible in an academic environment? Issues of
faith are nurtured as much, if not more so, by the
questions that faith raises, and not merely by the historic
creedal or confessional answers that faith has
traditionally given. Indeed, the very transmission of faith
has been sustained by the questions generated by the
faithful. Hence, one should agree with former St. Olaf
College president Mark Edwards that "there should be in
most cases no substantive difference between scholarship
by Christians and by non-Christians." However, one can
assume that the pedagogy at church-related campuses at
times might be markedly different from that at secular
campuses, since the church-related community of
scholars will expect and encourage questions about

In response to the dynamics of disengagement outlined
by Marsden and Burtchaell, we need to maintain that
Christian higher education should indeed attempt in a
specifiable way to integrate faith and learning across the
curriculum and in various facets of student life.
Admittedly, a school is not a church-nor should it be. A
school is a community of scholars seeking to further the
life of the mind. However, the unique heritage and
calling of church-related institutions of higher learning is
to attempt to find ways for faith and learning to connect.
This is a task unique to the church-related school, since it
11; not promoted by secular institutions or by other
agencies of the church. If we conceive of this integration
as a conversation between faith and learning, we can
recognize that both questions addressed to the faith from
outside of faith and questions arising from the faith to

INTERSECTIONS/Summer 2004

- 13 -

while the dogmatist needs to see his or her symbols
appropriately critiqued.

various disciplines, methods, and subject matters that
might address faith or be addressed by faith. In church
related colleges, a confessional tradition meets the wider
world of scholarship: this encounter mixes not the
ingredients of oppression or repression, but of lively
debate. Of course, one should not assume that religion
courses required for the baccalaureate degree by many
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)
schools will guarantee that faith and learning will be
cross-fertilized. As an academic discipline, the study of
religion in a church-related school may be done, indeed
perhaps often ought to be done, from a vantage point of
critical distance from faith, a "second order" reflection on
"first order" faith propositions. However, such critical
distance should never quiet questions of faith for the very
sake of achieving an alleged "academic freedom" in the
classroom. There is no wholly neutral stance in which
scholars do their work. Scholars are always framed by
traditions or perspectives.
In a church-related
environment, questions and issues of faith are, ironically,
a guarantee of the pursuit of academic freedom across the
curriculum, since they are not dismissed out of hand due
to secularistic bias.

The Lutheran
Education

Approach

to

Christian

Higher

As several scholars have argued, different Christian
traditions have tended to construe the relationship
between faith and learning in different ways.3 The
Reformed tradition has tended to integrate faith and
learning by subordinating learning to faith in order to
construct a unified and coherent single understanding of
reality, a purported "Christian worldview" since, after all,
all truth is God's truth. A consistent Reformed position
tends to be alarmed by the threat of secularization, since
it will attribute secularization as resistance to the
distinctive Christian perspective.4 The Roman Catholic
perspective tends to emphasize continuity between faith
and reason since it is apt to construe the material world in
virtually a "sacramental" way as a vehicle of God's grace
and presence. The Mennonite and/or "free church"
traditions emphasize not so much a distinctive Christian
understanding of the world as distinctive Christian
behavior-radical discipleship--a personal, practical,
and unique discipline as over against the world. While
appreciating the desire to relate faith and learning found
in all these approaches and, in fact, sensing a core of truth
in all of them, Lutheran higher education resists the
attempt to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world,
or the desire to insulate itself from the world, or the
supposition that there is an uncontested continuum
between faith and learning. Perhaps less confident in our
ability to interpret either our world or God's truth for the
world than these other perspectives, Lutheran higher
education tends to see its mission as establishing a
dialogue between faith and learning for the sake of
mentoring citizens who will serve both church and
society. The integration of faith and learning in a
Lutheran perspective, then, suggests thematizing a
conversation between the implications of faith for
learning and the implications of the various disciplines in
the arts and sciences for faith, when and where it is
appropriate.

The integration of faith and learning can happen and
often occurs in the outreach programs of campus ministry
centers at state and/or secular universities and colleges or
by various groups within currently demarcated research
arms of the academy. However, church-related colleges
ought to endeavor to bring faith and learning into
conversation in an intentional way in their many
endeavors and venues.
From the perspective of
democratic ideals and free inquiry, such a goal in no way
jeopardizes the autonomy or academic freedom of faculty
or students, since all members of a church-related
academic community have freely consented to the value
of this endeavor by their joining this particular
community of scholars.
Hence, as suggested by
Ricoeur's thinking, the atmosphere that ought to be
fostered on church-related campuses would avoid, on the
one hand, a skepticism that thinks that it is pointless to
seek truth or, in this case, the integration of faith and
learning, and, on the other hand, a dogmatism in which
one presumes to have discovered the definitive truth so
that no further questions need be asked.2 Rather, church
related higher education can foster an attitude of
hopefulness that faith can provide a vision of meaning,
meaningfulness, and even truth in and for the academy as
it inspires students to consider lives of dedicated service
to the world. Church-related higher education ought to
produce graduates who understand the responsibilities of
dual citizenship in both Athens and Jerusalem.
The
skeptic needs to take the risk of questing for meaning in
inherited symbols, despite these symbol's limitations,

A conversation between faith and learning should not be
misconstrued as one between public (learning) and
private matters (faith issues). It is not an exercise in
"values clarification." Rather, it involves the "to and fro"
or "give and take" movement in a dialogue generated by
two sets of possibilities: those of new life granted by the
gospel as they bear upon the life of the mind, and those of
the life of the mind as they bear upon our comprehension
of the gospel. A Lutheran approach to higher education
is guided by an affinnation that the world is properly
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God's, not our own, and that this truth liberates us from
any pretentiousness towards divinity that we might foster.
As people of faith, we can be free to accept our
creatureliness, our ultimate dependence upon God as a
loving creator. As people of faith, we can be free from
the anxiety that can cause humans to be "curved in" upon
themselves, as Luther put it. Indeed, we can be liberated
from our own quest for self-security and in this way we
are available to consider the needs of our neighbors and
the earth. Hence, people ought not to insulate their faith
from the challenges and prospects of the world, since the
gospel frees them to accept their creatureliness in and for
the world. We also ought to be suspicious of any
attempts to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world
since we can never assume, this side of the eschaton, that
our faith can somehow become sight. We walk, as St.
Paul puts it, "by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7). Faith
indeed should seek to understand everything it is capable
of understanding. Faith is seeking understanding, as St.
Augustine taught us. Indeed, St. Augustine is right to
note that far from faith making one blind, it is rather on
account of faith that one can see or understand anything
at all. However, furthering Augustinian thinking about
the relationship between faith and understanding, Luther
contended that genuine faith is bereft of empirical
measuring. Indeed, faith must be content to find God
under the "sign of the opposite," in suffering and the
cross,5 rather than in security or triumphalistic glory, with
which reason might feel more secure. Guided by a
healthy suspicion in the ability of the power of human
reason to determine or share a common home ground
with divine truth as such, since it is vulnerable to the
onslaught of the "labyrinthine depths of human self
deception,"6 a Lutheran understanding of the gospel
naturally can affirm dialogue as the best model for the
relating or integrating of faith and learning, since
dialogue especially can accommodate the ambiguity, or
the lack of sight, that genuine faith must accept even as it
seeks to make sense of its world.

to education, Lutherans can especially walk freely
because they know that education is not, and can never
be, salvific. While education can help sustain social
health, it can also be a vehicle of systemic distortions or
social "incurvation." It is the gospel alone, then, that
justifies the ungodly, not the processes or outcomes of
education. From a Lutheran perspective, education does
its job best when it directs us away from ourselves and
toward the needs of our neighbors and the earth.
Lutheran higher education holds out the prospect of being
guided by awe and wonder towards the creation, rather
than the fierce attempt to control nature for human's own
purposes. We are, as Robert Jenson has nicely phrased it,
to be gardeners of someone else's (i. e., God's) garden
(Jenson 113).
The wider academic context in the twentieth century has
not always been amenable to the cultivation of a
conversation between Athens and Jerusalem. The
"liberal-rationalist" tradition, as Richard Baepler has
designated it, has looked to the scientific method alone as
a norm for authority and has configured the purpose of
higher education to be primarily pragmatic in outlook. It
discredits the role of faith in public matters; faith, then, is
relegated to private matters. Lutheran higher education
has responded in different ways to this academic
tradition.
The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
(LCMS) schools, it could be argued, have generally opted
for a "sectarian" strategy that rejects many, if not most,
aspects of this tradition out of hand. ELCA schools,
perhaps, have in various degrees and ways tended to
accommodate this tradition. Much is to be learned from
the liberal-rationalist tradition.7 We should affirm the use
of scientific method and the important contributions that
an individual's creative self-expression in the academy
can offer the world. However, the overall record of the
liberal-rationalist tradition is ethically ambiguous and
some aspects of its outlook on the world are incompatible
with the Christian gospel. The liberal-rationalist tradition
rejects external authority and tradition, and affirms a
"common rationality" that presumes that objectivity
belongs solely to mathematics and the "hard sciences" of
physics, chemistry, and possibly biology. It tends to
reduce questions of truth to matters only of verification
within the confines of controlled inquiry and
demonstration.
Since the attempt to specify an
overarching common good is unobtainable to scientific
pursuit, the liberal-rationalist tradition fosters a highly
individualistic social policy. The self is "free" for any
number of ends as long as it does not limit the autonomy
for others. This tradition has altered the terrain for the
kind of education offered in "denominational colleges,"
such as Lutheran schools which, as established in the
nineteenth century, encouraged students to consider the

While historically the Lutheran tradition has tended to be
"quietistic" with regard to the economic, political, and
social "powers that be" that operate in the created order,
and has rightly been chastised for this social passivity,
there are certainly enough theological resources and
leverages within Lutheranism, were Lutheranism to
challenge its quietistic heritage. These powers are
susceptible to self-serving incurvation, our tendency, as
Luther put it, to be turned in upon ourselves. They
should not be uncritically trusted. These powers can be
instruments that further God's good creation, when they
help us to focus on the needs of our neighbors or the
earth. Nevertheless, they also are capable of systemic
distortions when they become self-serving. With regard
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unity of knowledge, human moral purpose, societal
leadership, and the classics of the West (Baepler 48). For
the liberal-rationalist heritage, Athens and Jerusalem
should not be in dialogue. Why? When seen as affecting
the public, faith threatens to constrain the autonomous
self. Furthermore, faith-lacking scientific verification
is viewed by those espousing this tradition as largely an
irrational matter.

In some perspectives, the liberal-rationalist approach to
higher education may be less ethically neutral or innocent
than it would lead us to believe. Indeed, as Max Weber
conceived the goal of the university from its perspective,
the university should seek mastery of the world through
calculation and control (Schwehn 58). That goal, from
the traditional Lutheran perspective, ought to be
challenged. It would be tantamount to ambitatio
divinitatis, the attempt of humanity to be its own god for
itself. It is the exact opposite of living by faith. The
results of our attempts at world mastery have
consequences for the overall health of the planet as well
as social, economic, and political inequities between rich
and poor. ELCA schools can offer society far more by
examining and challenging these aspects of the liberal
rationalist tradition. Some aspects of this tradition, such
as promoting free inquiry, are helpful and consistent with
the mission of ELCA-related higher education. However,
other aspects, such as its inherent individualism, run
counter to the goals of ELCA higher education.
Individualism undermines the attempt to develop a
concern for vocational service to church, neighbor, and
the earth.

In an era of increasing pluralism, the hegemony of the
liberal-rationalist tradition is less secure today than, say,
twenty or thirty years ago. However, it is still a
widespread and powerful social stance in the academy
and it is fueled by the conviction that both scientific
method as a path to truth (as opposed to "superstition")
and personal autonomy (as opposed to the heteronomy of
hierarchical churchly and political authority) need to be
preserved. Surely, the insight that this tradition offers for
faith is that genuine faith must be on guard lest it become
either superstitious or oppressively authoritarian.
However, many scholars have rightly challenged a
"verificationist" approach to truth that tends to pit science
against faith. Indeed, the humanities are relegated to
mere "taste" (about which, as the saying goes, there is no
dispute) from the perspective of "verificationism." While
verificationism has been widely discredited by many
thinkers, in The Outrageous Idea of Christian
Scholarship, George Marsden helpfully designates four
specific objections to it. Since the liberal-rationalist
tradition continues to wield considerable force in the
academy, it is worthwhile to present Marsden's four
points. First, the reliance on empirical scientific models
as the specific criteria for truth is simply misguided since
empirical science is not competent to provide definitive
answers to the larger questions of life, which we should
not assume to be properly configured as wholly
subjective issues. Second, the conviction that all
academic beliefs must be empirically based is
inconsistent, a double-standard; "it [the empirical
criterion] is not applied consistently to other
nondemonstrable beliefs that play prominent roles in the
secular academy." For instance, most academics believe
in the value of equal treatment for all people regardless of
gender or race. However, such a belief cannot be derived
from scientific argument. Third, religious beliefs cannot
be excluded from the academy since many "academics
are religious" and their beliefs will inevitably shape some
of their scholarship. And, finally, verificationism unduly
favors scholarship based on purely naturalistic
presuppositions. Scientific method has been widely
successful in much of the natural sciences. It, however, is
not itself scientifically self-verifying.

Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Retrieval: A
Challenge to the Liberal-Rationalist Tradition8

The need for church-related higher education to move
beyond the confines of the liberal-rationalist tradition
motivates the concern of this paper to investigate and
present the hermeneutical phenomenology of Paul
Ricoeur (born 1913), and to draw out the implications of
his philosophy for Lutheran higher education. Since the
liberal-rationalist tradition is unsuited to provide a
dialogical encounter between faith and learning for which
Lutheranism quests, it then behooves us to seek an
alternative model for education. Ricoeur is not an
educational philosopher.
Nevertheless, Ricoeur's
development of a reflexive philosophy that seeks to
interpret or rehear symbols, myths, and texts in terms of
susp1c1on and retrieval, or "distanciation" and
"appropriation," provides a model of dialogue with these
symbols, myths, and texts, harmonious with and
illustrative of how Lutheran higher education as itself
dialogical can be construed. In Ricoeur's work, issues of
faith are seen as public matters, offering plausible
perspectives on human identity, the nature of the good,
and the nature of the world. Developed within a modem
perspective, Ricoeur's work indicates that modernity
need not entail secularity. Furthermore, Ricoeur's
thinking unmasks a darker side to secularism that should
not be ignored. This section of this essay will offer an in
depth study of the development of Ricoeur's approach to
symbol, myth, metaphor, and narrative in order to reclaim
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a space for the construal of faith and learning as
dialogical, public, and worthwhile.

is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a proportion
between desires and ends, or freedom and finitude.
However, he determined that in order to understand fault,
phenomenology needs to appeal to and then interpret the
mythical tales of the origins of evil that pre-scientific
peoples devised.

Ricoeur's hermeneutics grew out of his work as a
reflexive philosopher working within the French
phenomenological tradition; Ricoeur saw the role of
philosophy as offering possibilities of an increased self
understanding linked to the questions of a meaningful life
and action. While himself a French Reformed Christian,
he bracketed issues of faith in his philosophical pursuits
in order to protect the integrity of both philosophy and
theology.9 For Ricoeur, philosophy should not be an
apologetic handmaid to theology, and theology should
feel its freedom to position itself with relation to
philosophy as it sees fit. His approach offered a self
critique of the Reformed perspective on relating faith and
reason, since he was not seeking to establish a Christian
"worldview." Similar to the Lutheran position presented
earlier, Ricoeur's work implies that faith offers
philosophy not a worldview but a critical engagement
upon its assumptions, methods, and intentions. Faith may
be able to accommodate diachronically and perhaps
synchronically a number of worldviews, but not every
worldview. The standard of testing a worldview for
Lutherans in light of Ricoeur's views ought to be whether
or not a given worldview is compatible with the
cruciform existence of Christian discipleship, one which
seeks to honor God above all things and seeks the
neighbor's and the earth's well-being. An analysis of
Ricoeur's intellectual journey, as we shall see, helps
illustrate an intellectual basis for the viability of a
dialogical approach to faith and learning, and how faith
issues are genuinely public.

In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur explored various
myths that sought to interpret the origin of evil such as
"primordial chaos," "primeval fall," "original
defilement," "exile from paradise," and "tragic fate,"
culminating in the affirmation of a "servile will." In
Ricoeur's view, such myths ironically were the attempt to
make sense of something inherently irrational, the
phenomenon of evil. Ricoeur's insight was that finally it
is only myth that can help us attempt to provide
categories for philosophical reflection about evil.
Ricoeur concluded that myth is a species of symbol-an
extended or "narrated" symbol. Following Rudolf
Bultmann 13 but likewise much of modem thinking about
mythology, he argued that myth must loose its
explanatory pretension or presumed "etiological
function." Nevertheless, Ricoeur contended that the
quest to "demythologize" should not be to deprive us of
myth, but instead to rid it of a "false logos" (Symbolism
of Evil 162), the illusion of offering a kind of crude
"science." In this way, myth can thus affirm its
exploratory significance, "its power of discovering and
revealing the bond between man and what he considers
sacred" (5). Or, as he stated it, ''The dissolution of the
myth as explanation is the necessary way to the
restoration of the myth as symbol" (350). Hence, in
contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, meaning is not
limited to the cognitive and empirical modes of
understanding; it is rather profoundly hermeneutical, 14 an
attempt to "listen" to the dimensions of experience that
would, without myth or symbol, be "closed and hidden."
Since much human behavior is symbolically construed,
Ricoeur's work opens vistas for philosophical and literary
inquiry that are either closed or limited when we focus
solely on concepts alone (as does Idealism) or sensations
alone (as does Empiricism) to help us understand reality.

The key to understanding Ricoeur's view of dialogue is
his analysis of a modem appropriation of mythical and
symbolic thinking. Some modems tend to ridicule myth,
but for Ricoeur myths hold the secret to some aspects of
human experience, if we are willing to engage them
dialogically. Early in his career, Ricoeur sought to
extend the thinking of his teacher Edmund Husserl10 by
producing a phenomenological description of the human
will.11 In order to attain the phenomenological standard
of "pure description" or a transparency between the will
s such and our conception of the will, Ricoeur initially
··· acketed the experiences of fault and transcendence.
hen he undertook to study the notions of fallibility and
. It, however, he acknowledged the limitations of
ilsserl's approach to explain these phenomena. 12 The
: usserlian perspective was far more comfortable with
Qtions like motives, powers, conditions, and limits
er than understanding how human fallibility is
pable of moving to fault. Ricoeur concluded that the
hdition of fallibility is due to the fact that for humans it

Ricoeur contended that far from being irrational, as many
in the liberal-rationalist tradition might claim, symbols
provoke us to think. How are they capable of doing this?
They do this because they are many-layered or
"polysemic." For example, the symbol "defilement"
conveys both a literal and a figurative connotation. The
latter, an analogy, where defilement is like stain or spot,
encourages our attempt to decipher just how similar in
any given judgment the analogy holds. Hence, as
Ricoeur so famously noted, "the symbol gives rise to
thought." This is because the attempt to decipher
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Ricoeur's move from Husserlian phenomenology to
hermeneutics, giving a public status to myth as an
unavoidable symbolic form of human self-understanding
and communication, provides a forum for faith matters to
position certain aspects of human life, such as freedom,
sin, origins, and destiny. It also suggests that the human
quest for truth involved in asking these questions is
meaningful, even though these questions transcend our
finite ability to achieve definitive answers. In Lutheran
terms, the purpose of education as dialogue is not to
foster the life of the mind for its own sake but is guided
by the possibility of nurturing a self-dispossessing life of
discipleship. The primary symbol of the cross, in the
Lutheran understanding, calls people to challenge idols
which they invent in order to gain security and a false
view of the self in which the self owns itself, and to live
"outside themselves" in God and for the sake of the
neighbor.

symbols is a thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical
enterprise. Ricoeur affirmed that the critical moment of
modern thinking (the heart of the liberal-rationalist
tradition) is a necessary and indispensable aspect of
humanity's process of intellectual maturation. We have
indeed "come of age," as Dietrich Bonhoeffer taught.
However, we are not limited solely to the resources of
this age. We can, and indeed should, "critique the
critique" by recognizing modernity's limits and its
tendency to inhibit our full understanding of reality or the
exercising of our full range of human inquiry. Myth and
symbol can continue to speak to us, if we are willing to
listen to them. Hence, Ricoeur described the
hermeneutical enterprise as a "wager"-a risk that pre
modern symbols can still address us, disclose truth to us,
and reveal possibilities of new experiences for us, despite
the fact that they die as causal explanations for things
(351). In this light, he claimed that it is not possible for
us moderns to return, like pre-scientific peoples, to a
"primitive naivete." However, by interpreting these
symbols, we can hear their truths again.

Truth as Manifestation
Having moved into hermeneutics, Ricoeur must
undertake the difficult task of better understanding the
ability of language to refer to extra-linguistic reality. For
Ricoeur, truth is to be found as manifestation and not
merely correspondence. Ricoeur inquired into the
question of truth in language by investigating the
semantic structure of referentiality in metaphor and
narrative. 17 In order to clarify his stance on language as
referential, Ricoeur appealed to Gottlob Frege's linguistic
distinction between "sense" and "reference." "Sense"
semiotically conveys the intra-linguistic dimension of
language-how words are to be distinguished from each
other in the intelligibility of a sentence as such. The
"reference," however, is the semantic dimension of
language that indeed refers to extra-linguistic possibilities
for human living in the world. Referentiality should no
longer be construed, as the Structuralists conceived it, as
solely an interplay among various signs within a text, nor
as the Romantics construed it, as a reader's reproduction
of an author's intentions. Instead, the text refers to
reality by disclosing possible new horizons of experience
for a reader. 18 From this perspective, truth is radically
reconceived, similar to the views of Martin Heidegger 19
and Hans-Georg Gadamer,20 as no longer an equivalence
between an image in the mind and reality as such but as a
disclosure of possible ways of living or new horizons of
experience. 21

Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics involves a circular
process that can be thematized as: "We must understand
in order to believe, but we must believe in order to
understand." Faith will wager or risk the possibility that
the symbol can still address the human by disclosing
meanings that can help humans position themselves with
regard to their relation in the cosmos and even to the
sacred. Hermeneutics, in a sense, is an act of faith,
though a kind of "secular" and not a specifically religious
faith.15 It clearly is never a "blind faith." Rather, it is
more a faith like St. Augustine's who claims that apart
from faith one cannot see. Symbols, then, encourage us
to think as we attempt to decipher their meanings for
people today. 16 But thought also returns us back to the
symbol, because we inescapably live within symbol
systems. There is no metaphysical or scientific "second
order" discourse that can dispense with the symbolic and
mythic "first order" discourse.
Since Ricoeur
acknowledged that symbols can legitimate and sustain
oppressive social systems, he listened carefully to the
"masters of suspicion" such as Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud who unmasked idols used to justify social
repression or inequities. Such idols must be smashed in
order to allow symbols to speak (Freud and Philosophy
532). An appropriate way in which to communicate to
others about the truth of a symbol is then "attestation,"
which for Ricoeur has become the hermeneutical
equivalent of certitude in other disciplines ( Oneself as
Another 21). The upshot here for Lutheran higher
education is that Ricoeur's work allows a space for
reflection to open about faith without the liberal
rationalistic bias that faith is inherently non-cognitive.

Emphasizing the impqrtance of discourse as the avenue
to truth-as-manifestation, Ricoeur's work naturally turned
in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to the question
of narrative, particularly toward the question of
establishing a relationship between narrative and time.22
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metaphysics of the twentieth century,"26 as Ernst Jilnger
phrased it), is that "we no longer participate in a cosmos,
but we now have a universe as the object of thought and
as a matter to be exploited." 27 It is the exposure of this
hidden ideology of exploitation laden in much scientific
and technological pursuit that led Ricoeur to note: "this
same consideration ought to lead us to call into question
the judgment modernity passes on what it makes appear
as an archaism. This judgment in its tum has already
begun to be judged itself. Modernity is neither a fact nor
our destiny. It is henceforth an open question."28

For Ricoeur, time is to be construed narratively as human
time and narrative is to be construed as temporal
experience. He isolated three hermeneutical moments to
narrative: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration.
Our ability to prefigure our world means that we
approach life with a preunderstanding of what human
acting and communication are. Our ability to configure
our world is our ability to "emplot," the act of "eliciting a
pattern from a succession," that is, to configure episodic
and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality.
It is the text, not the reader, who projects a world and
thus enlarges the reader.23 Our ability to re.figure our
world is the ability to decipher the ethical possibilities in
a situation suggested by the text. Education, from a
Ricoeurian perspective, ought to be seen as itself a
profoundly hermeneutical process as it exposes students
to various traditions and canons of critical inquiry.
Clearly, we can also infer from Ricoeur's hermeneutics
that faith is capable of bearing on public matters by
disclosing possibilities for how to reconfigure life in light
of faith in the gospel and love towards one's neighbor.
Truth is insight into the world and human relations, into
new directions for human life, and into discerning God's
will for humans; this reconception of truth parallels the
Lutheran view of education both as dialogical, open to
new horizons of experience, and as humble with regard to
our attempts to comprehend reality. It also implies for
Christians, in light of the power of the God who justifies
the ungodly, the possibility of serving in new practices of
charity in one's vocation on behalf of others and the
earth.

In a sense, for Ricoeur, the nature of the human is neither
fully nor properly expressed apart from some kind of
acknowledgment of the sacred. Technology's de
mystification of the cosmos results not only in the "death
of God," as it was expressed in the rnid-1960s, but also in
the death of humanity. This is the darker side of
secularity, which needs greater acknowledgement in the
academy. When the participants in the universe are
reduced to combinations of impersonal, albeit
interconnected machinery, it is not only the universe as
mysterious that dies, but also humanity as uniquely self
transcendent. Humanity is properly self-constituted only
within the horizon of mystery, wonder, awe, and joy, and
certain human events such as births, deaths, or corning of
age, are so evocative of both wonder and threat that only
religious ritualization offers an etiquette that rightly
responds to these mysteries. Ricoeur retrieved a sense of
mystery to the cosmos by means of affirming the
exploratory nature of myth, and the meaning-producing
patterns of metaphor and narrative in order to help
provide tools for better understanding our humanity and
to critique the one-dimensional aspect of human interest
that technology suggests. He also believed that while
talk of faith is not susceptible to empirical testing (faith
after all does not become sight)-nevertheless it is
capable of being rationally configured. Like Immanuel
Kant, Ricoeur was convinced that matters of faith can be
thought, even if they can not be known. Far from
violating one's personal autonomy, faith retrieves the
possibility of allowing the human to be seen in non
reductionist terms as personal and meaningful.
For
Ricoeur, the attempt to discern possible horizons of
experience from a symbol or a text is a risk, a hope that
being-as-such will or can give meaning to one's life by
venturing or wagering that life-altering possibilities can
be offered or given by the text or the symbol. Both the
skeptic and the dogmatist short-circuit the possibility of
hope because they think they can bring closure to the
discussion prematurely. Neither position genuinely
represents a stance of faith. However, a faith which can
embrace questions, even doubts, fulfills our humanity and
allows us to become ever more human in relation to God,

Ricoeur as Interpreter of Religion as a Dimension of
Human Experience

Ricoeur worked from within a "secular" framework. He
did not see himself as a Christian apologist. Indeed, he
bracketed issues of faith. Nevertheless, he criticized
secularistic assumptions that tend to trivialize faith or
actually repress questions of faith. His quest to retrieve
questions and issues of mystery and myth was solely for
the sake of unleashing the possibility of a more human
and more humane humanity, a possibility which is
lessened when the religious dimension to human
experience is repressed or ignored.24 In an important
.article "Manifestation and Proclamation," he lamented
that modernity "is constituted as modem precisely by
:having moved beyond the sacred cosmos" (61). Hence,
· �Modem persons no longer have a sacred space, a center,
templum, a holy mountain, or an axis mundi. Their
xistence is decentered, eccentric, a-centered."25 The
mifications of our domestication of nature and our de
ystification of it through our adoption of scientific
ethod and our ubiquitous use of technology (the "real
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others, and our own very selves. Hopefully, a Lutheran
understanding of the gospel in the context of higher
education affirms this truth.

The Contours and Value of Dialogue
What then are the contours or texture of dialogue for
Ricoeur? How can Athens and Jerusalem be in dialogue,
if this is indeed what the dual citizen of Lutheran higher
education desires? Ricoeur stresses that we need to
check our modem anti-mythic assumptions and learn that
some issues can only be understood mythically. We
need, in other words, to take the risk of challenging
ourselves and listening to the voice of the other in the
myth. Likewise, Ricoeur teaches us to think through the
new possible patterns of life suggested by various
symbols. Symbols push us towards a "give and take"
relationship between the other and ourselves. Narrative,
for Ricoeur, asks us how our lives might be refigured in
light of a story, implying a kind of attitude of open
endedness as we inquire how a text may alter our lives. It
seems, then, that there are four crucial components to a
phenomenology of dialogue on the basis of our
investigation of Ricoeur's hermeneutics and theory of
narrative: risk, listening, mutuality (give and take), and
open-endedness. These four are not to be understood in
either a temporal or a hierarchical sequence. However,
they do represent the phenomenological contours or
texture of authentic dialogue. First, when interpreters
approach a text or a symbol they must take the risk in
hopefulness and faith to venture that this symbol can
indeed continue to speak. The symbol of course may in
some sense deceive. The symbol or text may, for
instance, authorize or legitimate repression. Ricoeur
would have us test or question this of the symbol or text.
It may provide some kind of "false logos" that would
seek to explain reality in a quasi-scientific way. He
would have us challenge our assumptions about the
symbol or text. We need to be suspicious and yet hopeful
of retrieval as we undergo our suspicion. The hermeneut
falls short of certitude, yet not of thought. Second, the
hermeneut is a listener. Hermeneutics allows the symbol
or text to question us, to challenge us, to provoke us, to
permit us to question and test our deepest convictions and
assumptions. It is risky business indeed! It is an
interplay between exclusion and embrace, distance and
closeness, suspicion and retrieval, skepticism and
attestation. It is in this way that we listen to the text or
symbol-even as we question it. We ask: How might it
refigure our lives and make us different or hold out new
possibilities for us? Third, the fact that we stand between
suspicion and retrieval and reject both skepticism and
dogmatism guarantees that our task of interpretation, our
analysis of the possibilities of life reconfigured by the

text or symbol, will be a process of mutual give and take,
and hence, fourth, an open-endedness due to the "surplus
of meaning" in a text. Demythologization does not have
to lead to demystification or demythication. Indeed, even
scientific method in Ricoeur's perspective, should be
understood as likewise a hermeneutical task, the
interpretation of data and experience in light of models
which attempt a "critical realism," a possible, imaginative
way of representing the world. Ricoeur, like C. S. Lewis,
teaches Christians to affirm the mythic character of their
primary narratives. Gary Dorrien, interpreting Lewis
says, "If the Christ myth is true in the way that it claims
to be true, it stands to other myths as the fulfillment of
their promise and truth. It is not an illustration of mythic
truth, but the ground of its possibility and the realization
of its fragmentary glimpse of the Real"29 In this regard,
Lutherans need, at times, to look to the work of Thomas
Aquinas as a model in the art of Christian dialogue.
While risking his own faith by bearing the brunt of some
incompatible aspects of Aristotelianism with orthodox
Christian faith, Aquinas was also able to discern various
degrees of truth in Aristotle that he believed Christians
must appropriate. Likewise, contemporary Christians
will look to thinkers as diverse as Stephen Hawking and
the Buddha in their quest for truth, even though these
thinkers will challenge Christian faith while giving great
insights about life and the world.
What then does Ricoeur have to teach us about the value
of dialogue for church-related education? In Ricoeur's
perspective, issues of faith can engage the public arena;
they are no longer positioned by the "liberal-rationalist"
tradition. A dialogical approach to faith deals with public
matters by allowing scholars to reflect on religious
symbols and narratives with an eye to their impact upon
public life. In the context of the church-related college,
this discussion allows for how Christian narratives might
suggest new horizons of interpreting experience. It
should be clear that dialogue about matters of faith and
public life sometimes takes the voice of argument and
criticism. For both Lutherans and Ricoeurians, the
Christian scholar must often internalize important
criticisms of the Christian tradition made from outside
the tradition and seek to defend or revise the stance of
Christian faith. However, at other times, both Lutherans
and Ricoeurians recognize that the Christian scholar must
unmask secularity as itself offering an alternative faith
stance in opposition to and certainly no more justifiable
than Christianity. With dialogue, the Christian scholar
will seek to be as charitable as possible to the stances of
the non-Christian and extra-theological disciplines. Even
ethicists, in a sense, can teach chemistry, since the
attitudes they express about the discipline of chemistry
and how chemicals are best used offer important ideas for
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students to wrestle with. Since Christian scholars
recognize the world as God's world, even though this
truth is not universally acknowledged, they will seek to
build as many bridges as are possible with non-Christian
faith stances and extra-theological disciplines. They will
risk, listen, seek mutuality, and open-endedness in their
quest. Some features of the Christian perspective,
however, will remain non-negotiable in this discussion.
Christians might deliberate about how to accomplish
practices of peace in the world. However, they will not
debate the truth that peace is a goal that ought to be
achieved. In the Lutheran perspective, the scholar as a
Christian disciple will build such bridges between
disciplines and amongst people in order to be Christ to
and serve the "neighbor" in the context of the academy.
Both accomodationist and sectarian strategies towards
modernity short circuit dialogue, since they tend to
collapse the dialogue to a monologue, over-prioritizing
only one voice of the conversation. Lutheran higher
education will be best served when it charts a path
between these extremes. Lutheran higher education can
fulfill this task because it expresses the freedom. to
transgress boundaries established by Weberian
orthodoxies in the academy. Instead of favoring the
Weberian prioritization of instrumental reason and its
concomitant "fact-value" split, the pedagogy of Lutheran
higher education will sustain itself by raising those
irrepressible questions about human destiny, purpose, and
service to God and neighbor.

This side of eternity, we need to be very humble in how
we relate faith to learning. Our construction of models of
reality, even within theology, fail isomorphically to
correspond to reality. The Lutheran position of
attempting to establish a dialogue between faith and
learning honors the ambiguity that men and women of
faith actually experience in their current pilgrimage.
Nevertheless, worldviews will be constructed, especially
within the academy. Christians should join in the task of
building them. To the conversation, they will bring a
"discretion of spirits" (1 John 4: l); they will raise
questions of how the ultimate or God is named and
served, how the neighbor's needs are met, and how
stewardship of the earth is best done. The Lutheran quest
to establish this dialogue is a vigorously Christian, albeit
a humble, endeavor. The Lutheran educational insights
that ( l) dialogue between faith and learning is an
appropriate endeavor, (2) the world can be affirmed as an
arena of creative, spiritual activity, and (3) self-critique is
important in all our activities, can be furthered as we
have seen, by an encounter with Ricoeur' s hermeneutics
of suspicion and retrieval, the plausibility of myth as
disclosing truth, and the attempt to dialogue with the
other.
The Lutheran church 1s a confessional church.
Throughout its symbolic writings we encounter the
phrase "we believe, teach, and confess." In the school,
the church risks her confessional heritage. She is willing
to bracket it in order to listen to critiques and to discern
how to engage the gospel with the life of the mind. This
endeavor is a necessary venture, if Christians are to
continue their earthly pilgrimage in faith in God and in
service toward the neighbor. In the academy, the
contemporary Christian is no different than Abraham
who hears and obeys God's call, not knowing where he
or she will arrive. This legacy is worth our while to
transmit to our youth and also to model before the world.
In light of the inroads of the liberal-rationalist tradition in
ELCA schools, the challenge for many of our colleges
will be to create a space for this unique dialogue to occur.
One might well wager that those institutions which seek
to retrieve this calling will find their academic journey
adventurous, rewarding, and true to their calling.

Conclusion

Again, why should the church support institutions of
higher learning? How can the church fulfill its mission
through them? We might be tempted to think that the
attempt to establish a "Christian worldview" would be
the best answer to this question. However, following
both Luther's and Ricoeur's thinking, it is clear that
simply because a scholar uses "Christian" data or
attempts to devise a "Christian" method for seeking truth,
a "Christian" worldview is not guaranteed. However, is
not the attempt to establish such a worldview
presumptuous, in light of the gospel? Our faith will
·· become sight at the eschaton-but only at the eschaton.

Mark C. Mattes is professor of religion at Grand View College in Des Moines, Iowa.

I3aepler, Richard. "Toward an Understanding of Lutheran Character in Higher Education." The Lutheran Reader. Ed. by
Paul J. Contino and David Morgan. Valparaiso: Valparaiso University Press, 1999.
nson, Robert W. Systematic Theology: The Works of God, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
icoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970.
INTERSECTIONS/Summer 2004

- 21 -

Ricoeur, Paul. "Manifestation and Proclamation." Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Trans.
David Pellauer. Ed. Mark I. Wallace. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995.
Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blarney. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Ricoeur, Paul. The Symbolism of Evil. Beacon Press, 1990.
Schwehn, Mark. Exiles from Eden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Notes
1

L. DeAne Lagerquist has shared with me the insight that for many Lutherans, the Lutheran tradition in higher education functions as
a compass that orients our outlook on the world and not a map that would seek a totalizing perspective.
2
In his article "Philosophy and the Unity of Truth,"Ricoeur claims "If all history engenders a degree of skepticism, every claim to
truth fosters a degree of dogmaticism. From this point of view, history would only be a history of errors and truth would be the
suspension of history." See History and Truth, trans. C. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 42.
3
The following discussion is dependent onRichard T. Hughes and William B. Adrian's Models for Christian Higher Education:
Strategies for Success in the Twenty-First Century (GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1997).
4
See Ernest L. Simmons, Lutheran Higher Education: An Introduction for Faculty (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 31.
5
Hence in The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer and 0.R. Johnston (New York: Fleming H.Revell, 1957), 101, Luther wrote,
" ... faith's object is things not seen. That there may be room for faith, therefore, all that is believed must be hidden. Yet it is not
hidden more deeply than under a contrary appearance of sight, sense and experience. Thus, when God quickens, He does so by killing;
when he justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when he carries up to heaven, he does so by bringing down to hell." Consider
also Luther's 20th thesis of the Heidleberg Disputation: "He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross."
6
SeeRichard Baepler, "Toward an Understanding of Lutheran Character in Higher Education" in The Lutheran Reader, ed. by Paul J.
Contino and David Morgan (Valparaiso: Valparaiso University Press, 1999), 50.
7
I am adapting the categories "sectarian" and "accomodationist" fromRonald Thiemann's categorization of strategies among
churches for dealing with secular critique of religion from modernity. See his Religion in Public Life: A Delimma for Democracy
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 55.
8 I am grateful for BruceReichenbach's perceptive critique of this section of this essay, which pushed me to connect with greater rigor
Ricoeur's approach to dialogue with that of Lutheran higher education.
9
Hence, in Oneself as Another [trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992)] Ricoeur claims that "It
will be observed that this asceticism of the argument, which marks, I believe, all my philosophical work, leads to a type of philosophy
from which the actual mention of God is absent and in which the question of God, as a philosophical question, itself remains in a
suspension that could be called agnostic" (24). He also argues, "The reference of biblical faith to a culturally contingent symbolic
network requires that this faith assume its own insecurity, which makes it a chance happening transformed into a destiny by means of
a choice constantly renewed, in the scrupulous respect of different choices. The dependence of the self on a word that strips it of its
glory, all the while comforting its courage to be, delivers biblical faith from the temptation, which I am here calling
cryptophilosophical, of taking over the henceforth vacant role of ultimate foundation" (25). He goes on to cite Eberhard Jungel's anti
foundationalist approach to theology as a convincing and winsome theological method.
10 For an examination of Husserl's philosophy, see his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce
Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), and Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl
Americks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
11
SeeRicoeur's Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. E. V. Kobak (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966). For studies ofRicoeur's thinking, see Don Ihde's Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), David Wood, ed. On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (London: 1991),
Charles E.Reagan, Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), T. Peter Kemp and David
Rasmussen, eds. The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), David Klemm, The
Hermeneutical Theory Of Paul Ricoeur: A Constructive Analysis (London: Bucknell University Press, 1983), and David Klemm and
William Schweiker, eds. Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1993).
12
See Fallible Man, trans. Charles A Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), xlii.
13 In "Preface to Bultmann," published in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 49-72,
Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann for jumping too quickly from kerygma to faith; one should not bypass the question of language's ability
to reconfigure our lives.
14
Ricoeur defined the task of the hermeneutics as twofold: "to reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text and to restore to the work
its ability to project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that I could inhabit." See "On Interpretation" in From Text to
Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991),
18.
15 Hence in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 28,
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Ricoeur concludes "The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, the first faith of the simple
soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith."
16
Here Ricoeur's Kantianism can be seen at its clearest. Ricoeur's notion of "symbols" is comparable to Kant's notion of "aesthetic
ideas," ideas for which no concept is adequate. Kant describes this category in his Third Critique which, unlike the First Critique
which deals with knowledge or the Second Critique which deals with desire, deals with judgment, specifically the attempt to establish
regulative, a priori, non-constitutive principles that can help us understand both our aesthetic judgments and our teleological approach
to nature. For Kant's discussion of "aesthetic ideas" see The Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafuer, 1951),
157.
17
In order to affirm a referential dynamic to language he countered the structuralist perspective on language, popular among French
intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century. Structuralism reduced language to a finite system of signs whose significance is
determined by differences among the signs themselves and not from the signs' ability to refer to extra-linguistic reality as such.
Ricoeur was troubled that in the structuralist perspective language is no longer treated as a "form of life," as Ludwig Wittgenstein
would call it, but as a "self-sufficient system of inner relationships." Ricoeur's major criticism of structuralism was that "Language is
not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we
orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language." See
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 20-21.
18
As Ricoeur noted: "What has to be appropriated is the meaning of the text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of
thought opened up by the text. In other words, what has to be appropriated is nothing other than the power of disclosing a world that
constitutes the reference of the text." See Interpretation Theory, 92.
19
According to Heidegger an artwork "sets up" a world. See ''The Origin of a Work of Art" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans.
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), 44.
20 Truth and Method (New York Continuum, 1975), 273.
21
Hence, Ricouer claims "Far from saying that a subject already mastering his own way of being in the world projects the a priori of
his self-understanding on the text and reads it into the text, I say that interpretation is the process by which disclosure of new modes of
being-or if you prefer Wittgenstein to Heidegger, of new forms of life-gives to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself. If the
reference of the text is the project of a world, then it is not the reader who primarily projects himself. The reader rather is enlarged in
his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself." See Interpretation Theory, 94. Mark I. Wallace
further clarifies Ricoeur's position on understanding with the statement that it "occurs in the to-and-fro dialogue between text and
interpreter whenever the interpreter is willing to be put into question by the text and risk openness to the world of possibilities the text
projects." See "Introduction" to Ricoeur's Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer and ed.
Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 9.
22
See his magisterial Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1984, 1984, 1988).
23 In his last major work, Oneself as Another, Ricoeur explores ethics from his narrative perspective. He argues that the question of
personal identity should be constructed as ipseity, the quest to give intelligibility to one's life by means of composing one's own
narrative about the self and not idem, the notion of the self as same. Hence, the self is best seen as developed by means of dialectic
between self and the other than the self.
24 See "Manifestation and Proclamation" in Figuring the Sacred.
25 Ibid.
26
See John Wilkinson's "Introduction" to Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage,
1964), ix.
27
Ibid, 61-62.
28
Ibid.
29
See The Word as True Myth: Interpreting Modern Theology (Louisville: Westminster, 1997), 237.
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